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 Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional
 'Structure' of Assertion
 JOHN N. WILLIAMS
 Michael Welbourne [8] thinks he has a better account of Moorean asser-
 tion than O. R. Jones [4] or Thomas Baldwin [1]. All three are wrong, but
 not for the sometimes mistaken reasons given in the debate. Each tries to
 explain Moorean assertion in terms of 'the intentional structure of asser-
 tion' ([1], p. 230). But there is no intentional structure common to all types
 of assertion. Moorean assertion is better explained in terms of the hearer
 of an assertion.
 1. Baldwin's Account
 Baldwin thinks that the primary intention of assertion is 'providing one's
 audience with information [belief in what is asserted] through their recog-
 nition that this is one's intention' ([1], p. 228), i.e.
 (Bl) If I assert that p to you then I intend that you will come to believe
 that p because you recognize that I intend this.
 He thinks that this intention entails the secondary 'intention to be believed
 to believe what one asserts' and adds that 'the speaker also intends that the
 audience should believe what he asserts' ([1], p. 228), i.e.
 (B2) If I assert that p to you then I intend that you believe that I believe
 that p.
 and
 (B3) If I assert that p to you then I intend that you believe that p.
 Since the intention in (Bl) supposedly entails that in (B2), success of the
 former entails success of the latter, i.e.
 (B4) If I get you to believe what I say then you think I'm sincere.
 Baldwin needs both (B2) and (B3) to explain the absurdity of assertions
 of the forms (a) 'p and I don't believe that p' and (b) 'p and I believe that
 not-p'. (B2) is applied to my assertion that p, and (B3) is applied, in (a), to
 my disavowal of belief (or in (b), to my avowal of belief that not-p). So by
 (B2), when I assert that p, I intend you to believe that I believe that p. I also
 assert, in (a), that I don't believe that p, and in (b) that I believe that not-
 p. So by (B3) I intend you to believe that I don't believe that p, in (a), or
 intend you to believe that I believe that not-p, in (b).
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 Jones objects that 'if the possibility of contradictory beliefs is left open
 then the possibility of allegedly absurd intention has to be allowed as well
 ... [but] it is not, in case (b), a matter of the speaker intending an impossi-
 bility' ([4], p. 184). But this is mistaken. In (a) I intend you to have
 contradictory beliefs and in (b) I intend you to think I have them. In neither
 case is it a matter of the speaker intending an impossibility, given the possi-
 bility ([7] p. 27, [11]) of contradictory beliefs. Moreover, Baldwin does not
 explicitly explain Moorean assertion in terms of 'necessarily frustrated'
 ([4], p. 184) intentions, nor does he need to. An intention can be absurd
 for other reasons, although Baldwin does not provide them. My intention
 that you should ascribe contradictory beliefs to me is absurd, not because
 I cannot succeed, but because in effect, I aim to give you a licence for judg-
 ing me irrational. However, in (a) it is hard to explain the alleged absurdity
 of my aim (or that of Orwell's Thought Police) to make you hold contra-
 dictory beliefs, and so if Baldwin's account is to be underpinned by the
 notion of absurd intentions, this is where it fails.
 2. Jones's Account
 Jones accepts ([4], p. 185) McDowell's claim that 'The basic intention [of
 a speaker] is transference of knowledge by testimony' ([5], p. 127). Since
 this is his only change to Baldwin's account, his view of the primary inten-
 tion is:
 (J1) If I assert that p to you then I intend that you will come to know
 that p because you recognize that I intend this.
 For Jones, this intention succeeds only if the audience takes 'the speaker to
 know the truth of what he asserts.' ([4], p. 185), i.e.
 (J2) If I let you know something then you think I know it.
 This account explains (b) as follows: if someone asserts that (p and I
 believe that not-p), he asserts that he believes that not-p. As the hearer, I
 will 'inevitably suppose that there is some reason why he believes so' ([4],
 p. 185) and thus I will not believe that he knows that p and hence, given
 (J2) I will not come to know that p. So the speaker frustrates his primary
 intention in (J1).
 Welbourne rightly objects that the hearer's supposition is not inevitable
 ([8], p. 238). This point can be supplemented. The supposedly inevitable
 supposition is plausibly read as the supposition that the speaker has a
 reason for his belief. But when I assert (a) I assert a lack of belief and since
 there is no belief to which reasons can attach, the supposition cannot be
 sensibly made. But although Welbourne rightly concludes that 'the para-
 dox is not underpinned in the way Jones thinks it is' ([8], pp. 237-8), the
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 account can easily be repaired. Jones needs only the claim that if we take
 the second conjunct seriously then we are entitled to doubt that the speaker
 knows that p - for people do not usually know what they believe to be false
 (in (b)), nor can they know what they don't believe (in (a)). So although
 'reasons do not come into it' ([8], p. 238), they aren't needed to underpin
 his account.
 3. Welbourne's Account
 Welbourne agrees with Jones that 'in normal circumstances the dominant
 intention of someone making an assertion is to impart knowledge' ([8], p.
 237), and thus accepts (J1). The difference is that Welbourne thinks that
 this intention succeeds only if the hearer believes the speaker, i.e.
 (W1) If I let you know something then you believe me.
 The consequent, he thinks, 'involves an understanding on the believer's
 part that the speaker has ... an intention to be recognized as intending to
 impart knowledge ... [and an] ... acceptance on the believer's part that the
 speaker really has the knowledge ...' ([8], p. 238), i.e.
 (W2) You understand that (A) I intend that you recognize that (B) I
 intend to impart the knowledge that p to you
 and
 (W3) You accept that I know that p.
 So by (J1), when I assert (a) or (b), I intend to impart my knowledge that
 p. But in saying, in (a), that I don't believe that p or, in (b), that I believe
 that not-p, I give you grounds for believing that a condition of my knowing
 that p (namely my belief that p) is not satisfied. Accordingly you won't
 accept that I know that p, so (W3) is false and hence so is the consequent
 of (W1) - you don't believe me. So I fail to let you know that p. Hence I
 have frustrated my intention (in J1), because I have told you in effect that
 I am insincere.
 4. Varieties of Assertion
 Welbourne sees that the truth-value of claims about an assertion can
 depend on whether it is described factively e.g. as letting know, or non-
 factively, e.g. as telling ([8], p. 240). But the choice of description is wider
 than this. We can also describe an assertion factively as reminding, admit-
 ting or confessing, or non-factively, as claiming, contending, insisting,
 controverting or denying. We can even describe it anti-factively as misin-
 forming - but not as lying, which is non-factive, since liars sometimes
 inadvertently tell the truth.
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 The primary aim of a liar is to get his hearer to believe what he says. In
 order to establish the authority needed to achieve this, he also has a
 secondary aim to be taken to be sincere. So lies fit Baldwin's account of
 primary intention but not Jones's or Welbourne's, since liars do not intend
 to impart knowledge, unlike teachers. By contrast, the assertions of a
 sincere teacher cannot be explained by Baldwin, because they do not
 normally need to intend their sincerity to be taken as such (cf. [8], p. 240),
 i.e. (B2) is false.
 Now consider the following cases of contending, reminding and claim-
 ing, which fit none of the accounts. In case (I), I tell you something which
 is provocatively contentious. My aim is to 'wind you up'. Here I intend you
 to not believe me, since I think that you disbelieve what I am about to say.
 In (II), I realize that there is a crucial fact which you know but have not
 included in our calculations. So I remind you, not of the fact that p, but
 rather of its significance, by asserting that p. (III) is a case of claiming with-
 out claiming to know, commonly found in predictions. I look at the sky
 and say emphatically, 'It will rain soon'. I will admit that I don't pretend
 to have anything as strong as knowledge, but nonetheless my conviction is
 firm. My aim in (I) is not to share belief or knowledge, but to remain
 divided in belief. In (II) and (III), my aim is not to impart knowledge, since
 I know, in (II), that you already have it, and in (III), that I don't have it. So
 in each case (J1), which Welbourne accepts, and (Bl) are false, and in (I),
 (B3) is false.
 So these assertions do not have the primary (nor for Baldwin, the
 secondary) intentions that each three think are necessary. They cannot be
 dismissed as abnormal, since Moorean assertions made by liars, provoca-
 teurs, or claimants of belief without knowledge do not cease to be absurd,
 especially since the hearer is rarely in a position to know the correct
 description of the assertion.
 5. Believing the Speaker
 Although the crux of Moorean absurdity is the idea of believing the
 speaker, Welbourne analyses it incorrectly. (W2) is not necessary for your
 believing me. Since understand and recognize are both factive verbs,
 (W2) is necessary only if (B) is necessary, given that I don't have inten-
 tions that I know will fail. But when I lie or attempt to provoke
 controversy, I have no intention of imparting knowledge, so (B) is false.
 Yet liars, and disappointed provocateurs, can be believed. Second, I
 know that (A) is too sophisticated for my five-year-old son to understand.
 Yet naivete goes hand-in-hand with credulity - he nearly always believes
 me.
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 (W3) is not necessary for your believing me either. In case (III) you may
 recognize that I have no pretensions to knowledge. Yet you look at the sky
 and conclude that I am right. Moreover you have no reason to doubt my
 sincerity. So you believe me. Second, suppose that you recognize that a
 Gettier-type situation holds - that my reason for my assertion is not the
 reason that makes it true. You will not accept that I know what I assert,
 but if you take me to be sincere and have your own reasons for accepting
 what I say, you will believe me.
 These examples suggest that Welbourne is too hasty to reject 'a simple
 analysis [of believing a speaker] in terms of belief-acquisition' ([8], p. 238).
 Admittedly, believing me is not simply your belief in what I say. If you
 know that I have got my facts wrong in my attempt to deceive you, you
 may believe what I say, but you don't believe me, any more than you
 believe a parrot which utters 'I can fly'. So believing me includes the belief
 that I am sincere. To believe me is to believe that I sincerely tell the truth.
 It follows that believing me when I assert that p, is consistent with your
 willingness to admit that your conviction that p stops short of knowledge.
 By Welbourne's plausible principle that: If you believe that I know that p
 then you believe that you know that p ([8], p. 238), it follows that you do
 not accept that I know that p. Again, (W3) is not needed for you to believe
 me.
 6. The Solution
 The diverse nature of assertion, whether factive or not, shows that there is
 no intentional structure of assertion, apart from the unhelpfully general
 fact that in every type of assertion there is some intention to do with
 knowledge or belief. The explanation of Moorean assertion must therefore
 avoid the messy business of intentions by telling a story about the hearer.
 My original story ([9], [10]) was that if I assert that p, I express a belief
 that p. I will now explain this. Deception is not just, as Moore thinks ([6]
 pp. 542-3) vastly exceptional, but necessarily so. If people were not gener-
 ally sincere then deception would be impossible. So when I assert
 something, I give you the prima facie right to think I believe it. Even known
 liars offer this right, although it is rescinded by knowledge of insincerity
 (cf. [1], p. 230).
 This right is frustrated by the second conjunct of a Moorean assertion. I
 tell you in (a) that I'm not sincere, and in (b) you can only think me sincere
 if you think I'm irrational (in holding contradictory beliefs). Alternatively
 put, when I assert that p, I express that I believe that p. I also assert in
 (a), a lack of belief that p or in (b), a belief that not-p. So I conjointly
 assert and express a logical impossibility in (a) and contradictory beliefs
 in (b).
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 In both cases this is precisely what you must believe if you are to believe
 me. For then, since you think me sincere in asserting the first conjunct, you
 believe that I believe that p. And since you believe what I say in the second
 conjunct, you believe that I don't believe that p in (a), and you believe that
 I believe that not-p in (b). If you are to believe me, you must have contra-
 dictory beliefs in the first case (conclusive grounds for disbelieving me),
 and you must think I have them in the second (conclusive grounds for
 believing me irrational). Jones's description of an encounter with an asser-
 tor of (b), 'I happen to be as credulous as he is irrational' ([4], p. 184),
 exactly fits my analysis. Had the assertion been of (a), he might have said,
 'Since I happen to be rational, I'm incredulous'.
 But there is more to Moorean absurdity than absurd assertion, since (a)
 and (b) remain absurd if I do not assert, but merely believe them.
 What makes Moorean belief absurd? Baldwin's answer is that I cannot
 be rational if I consciously believe (a) or (b), since this requires me in (a) to
 believe that I believe and fail to believe the same thing, and in (b) to believe
 that I believe and disbelieve the same thing ([1], p. 230). Baldwin presum-
 ably reasons that since my belief in the first conjunct of (a) or (b) is
 conscious then I believe that I believe that p, and since I believe the second
 conjunct then I believe that I don't believe that p in (a) and I believe that I
 believe that not-p, in (b).
 But deriving the single beliefs supposedly required, needs the disputed
 ([12], pp. 125-31) principle that a conjunction of beliefs entails a belief in
 a conjunction. In any case the explanation is lame for (b). Although in (a)
 I am irrational to believe a self-contradiction, (if the principle is true) or to
 hold contradictory beliefs (if it isn't), my belief in (b) that I hold them is
 less so, since consciousness of inconsistency may be the first step in resolv-
 ing it. Moreover, if my belief in (a) or (b) is unconscious, it is still absurd.
 It is mistaken to think that because the content of a belief could be true,
 it would be possible to believe it correctly. Although (a) is a possible truth
 that can be believed, it cannot be true if it is believed. If I believe it, then I
 believe that p, for to believe a conjunction is to believe its conjuncts. But then
 (a) is false, since its second conjunct is false. By contrast, (against [2], p. 54)
 I can correctly believe (b), since my belief that p is consistent with its second
 conjunct if I hold contradictory beliefs, one of which is therefore incorrect.
 So a Moorean believer is irrational because he is committed to the neces-
 sity of at least one incorrect belief.1 And a Moorean assertor entitles a
 hearer to make that criticism. The hearer may not be able to make it, since
 he may be unable to locate that commitment, nor may he be correct in
 This is essentially Deutscher's subsequent solution ([3], p. 184), which however fails
 to distinguish (a) and (b).
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 assuming that the assertor believes what he asserts. Nonetheless the criti-
 cism can be justifiably made.
 It should now be apparent that what Jones thinks ([4], p. 184) is a vice
 of Baldwin's account - that (a) and (b) are differently absurd - is a virtue.
 This difference, of which both Jones (in explaining Moorean assertion)
 and Baldwin (in explaining Moorean belief) fall afoul, is one of sorts rather
 than of mere forms ([2], p. 184; [1], p. 227) of absurdity.
 To conclude, the unified solution is that if both parties are minimally
 rational then a Moorean assertor is unbelievable, and then a would-be
 Moorean believer cannot believe the content of the assertion. The differen-
 tiated solution is that a Moorean assertor either cannot be rationally
 believed, or cannot be believed to be rational; and a Moorean believer is
 irrational either because his belief cannot be correct, or because it entails
 incorrect belief.2
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